

CONFIDENTIAL

9 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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FROM:

Chief, Classification Review Division/ISS/DDA

SUBJECT: Update on Processing and Classification Review
of OSS Permanent Records

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1. On 16 January 1980 a meeting was held to discuss and update the situation in the systematic classification review of permanent OSS records. The participants, in addition to the members of the OSS Review Team, included [REDACTED] C/IMS/MPG, [REDACTED] also of IMS/MPG, [REDACTED] C/CRD/OPS, and [REDACTED] DC/CRD/OPS. The following comments are a record of the results of the meeting. They are intended to serve as an aid to processing OSS permanent records and to serve as guidelines for handling certain categories of information. 25X1A

2. We continue to have some problems identifying which records to tab for DO withdrawal (for verification of service, etc.) before these records go to NARS. Some of the rules are:

Rule 1: We tab for DO withdrawal only whole folders or summary documents which would ordinarily represent a whole folder reporting individual events. If we discover an individual document in the middle of a general administrative file and that document would not be retrievable by the name of the individual, we do not tab it. We leave it for NARS or, if it must remain classified, we withdraw it and process it into the DARE system as any other classified document.

Rule 2: Except for payroll records, we do not tab any financial records. These, like other records, however, may be withheld to protect sources and methods. One known example of a payroll record from OSS is in the form of yellowish cards a little less than 8x10 containing the name and a series of entries showing the dates and amounts of payments made to that individual. These should be tabbed for IMS removal. Such payroll records have been found in Job #61-934 described as "correspondence, memorandums, authorizations, budgets, vouchers, receipts, payments, salaries, and related material pertaining to the expenditure of special funds by the Washington [REDACTED] offices; arranged alphabetically; 1942-1947; with volume of 47 cubic feet." This Job was declared Permanent by Col. Tagge and was included in the second offering made to NARS. 25X1A

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Rule 3: We tab for DO withdrawal personnel material, i.e., material about an individual or group of individuals that contains substantive information on their service in or for the OSS and which would be responsive to inquiries from former OSS personnel about their service. The presence of a large number of Chargeout Sheets and/or Routing and Record Sheets will indicate some of those records which have been useful to CIA in answering requests and should therefore receive strong consideration for tabbing so they can be withdrawn and held by the DDO. Against these CIA needs we must balance NARS interests to carefully document the role of the OSS in history. Some examples: We tab 201 files, official personnel files, soft files on individuals, files that document where and when people served, what operations or activities they engaged in; i.e., personnel files which significantly document official relationships for which CIA might still retain a moral or legal responsibility. In the case of general cable files where individual biographical sheets are sometimes attached, we must use the balance test. Generally such files should be left for NARS but judgment will be required in each case. Lists of OSS personnel would not normally be considered a personnel file and can generally be released. Such a list, however, could name so many OSS personnel that we might consider it classified and withhold it after using the balance test. If the list includes the names of foreign liaison officers or NOC officers we would exempt it. Concerning the written citations for awards and certificates, we tab them for DO withdrawal and [REDACTED] will check to see whether the DO may want to initiate action to deliver these papers to the recipients. We also tab the field PHS's from [REDACTED] with photo and secrecy agreement since most of those identified [REDACTED]

3. Some boxes of records have been missing from certain jobs sent to the Review Team. To explain this, [REDACTED] noted that he makes a "broad cut" of the records at AARC to remove temporary records and this accounted for the missing boxes. On this point, it was agreed that: (1) [REDACTED] will update the listing of OSS material to include the numbers of the boxes which have been removed during his initial review; and (2) the OSS Review Team will continue to make the more refined cut of temporary records by tabbing those they encounter as identified in this paper and other published guidelines.

4. Job 56-16 contains the records of the OSS Headquarters Registry Chrono. Much of this material remains classified and has to be withdrawn and held. Generally, chrono files are considered to be temporary records and based on this assumption plus the high percentage of material which must be withheld, IMS has appealed the ruling by Col. Tagge that this file is a permanent record. No ruling has yet been received from NARS.

5. Jobs 76-460 and 76-565 are the records for the OSS activity known as the Survey of Foreign Experts. This involved OSS identifying, locating, and interviewing Americans and foreigners for information which could contribute to the war effort. Since those persons interviewed were promised confidentiality, often in writing, SFE records will require close screening to ensure protection of sources. Information concerning the organization,

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administration, and functioning of SFE can be released to NARS. SFE reports often identify the source and it's these reports which will require exemption and this should be done on a folder basis when more than 50% of the material requires continued protection. Withdrawal Notices will be given to NARS and 4023A forms completed to cover each folder or box of SFE records.

6. Jobs 56-16 and 56-20 are the chronos of dispatches and field cables respectively, apparently consolidated when OSS field records were forwarded to Washington after the War. As in item c above, such chronos are generally considered temporary records and therefore the decision to make these permanent records has been appealed to NARS but no answer has been received as yet.

7. Job 66-596 contains the prints (which are practically unreadable) from the microfilm of Gen. Donovan's files. IMS has determined that these documents are duplicated by microfilm of the Director's files contained in Jobs 57-91 and 61-453. Job 66-596 will be held by IMS; it will not go to NARS. No Withdrawal Notice forms or 4023A forms will be completed for Job 66-596.

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8. Job 56-28 consists of photocopies of documents from [REDACTED] security service and as such will be withheld in toto to protect sources and methods. Withdrawal Notices and 4023A forms will be completed for each box of these records.

9. Job 69-59 contains the 4x6 reference cards for SI reports. NARS wants these cards as they constitute an index to SI reporting. We will pull those cards relating to CIG and CIA reports as these are not, strictly speaking, OSS records. According to IMS, Col. Tagge has agreed to our withdrawing of CIG and CIA cards. It will be necessary to use Withdrawal Notices and complete 4023A forms on OSS and SSU reference cards which require continued protection but not on the CIG and CIA cards which simply will be pulled and given to IMS.

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11. All field intelligence reports will be handled according to their date. The field intelligence reports dated on or after 1 January 1946 will be tabbed. These reports will be pulled by IMS. No record will be left for NARS since these reports are not OSS records but post-date the OSS period and

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also are excluded from release by the Director's letter of 16 October 1978. Before disposing of these reports, IMS will check to see whether copies of these reports exist elsewhere in chronos or other office files. All field intelligence reports dated prior to 1 January 1946 will be declassified and left for NARS unless they should be withheld to protect sources and methods, foreign government information, or U.S. foreign relations. One category of such reports discussed was reporting from [REDACTED] sources. They will be withheld to protect foreign government information particularly in view of the recently received request [REDACTED] to protect such information. CRP 79-005/USS has been re-written to reflect this policy for handling field intelligence reports.

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12. Guidelines for the review of records relating to technical devices and weapons were recently updated by the Office of Technical Services. [REDACTED] of OTS spot-checked the classification review of OSS Division 19 records previously done by the OSS Review Team. The one point to come out of this, and this point was reaffirmed by [REDACTED] was that manuals relating to technical devices, weapons, and explosives should not be released. This decision has NARS concurrence. The principal reason for holding such material is that it is not in the interests of the American public to release it. This is true even if such material has previously been released and even published because it is felt that new releases could only compound the threat. Individual documents, however, may be released. Although most if not all technical manuals were withheld by the OSS Review Team, IMS intends to screen Division 19 records very thoroughly to ensure that no improper releases are made. Copies of [REDACTED] memorandum to Chief, IMS, dated 8 November 1979, giving the result of his review and the guidelines to be used in reviewing technical records, are available to the OSS Review Team.

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13. Job 57-94 contains, among others, records of the special fund. Generally, financial records are left for NARS. These records, however, include many large financial accounting ledgers containing hundreds of entries and names of persons not further identified. [REDACTED] agreed that all of these special fund records should be withheld to protect sources. Withdrawal Notices and 4023A forms should be used on a folder or ledger basis. [REDACTED] stated that all records relating to proprietaries will be withheld. We will process these records by folder also wherever possible.

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14. Job 56-66 contains finance records from various OSS stations. Most of this material can be released to NARS although occasionally an agent is identified. When such a document must be withheld, it should be processed like any other classified document to be withheld and put into the DARE system.

15. When the OSS Review Team receives microfilm records, they should first check with [REDACTED] to ensure that there is no other record (particularly on paper) available which could be reviewed more easily. If microfilm records must be reviewed, any entry which cannot be declassified will cause the withholding of the entire roll of microfilm. Withdrawal

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
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Notices and 4023A forms will be completed on rolls of microfilm which are withheld.

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Distribution:

Orig - File

1 - C/CRD

3 - C/MPG/IMS

1 - DC/CRD/OPS

4 - C/CRD/OPS

15 - C/CRD/OPS/OSS

1 - Chrono

DDA/ISS/CRD/ [redacted] jhp(9 Apr 80)

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C/OPS

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13 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25X1A
FROM:

[REDACTED]
Chief, Classification Review Division, ISS, DDA

SUBJECT: Input into the DARE System of Some Temporary Material
from OSS Records

1. The 6,500 cu. ft. (approximate) of OSS records break down into four groups as they are processed for accessioning to NARS.

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a. There is a group in bulk (about 3,200 cubic feet) which was declared temporary by Col. Tagge with some material added by Paul [REDACTED] of IMS/MPG who prepared the OSS records for classification review. [REDACTED] cut was also done essentially by bulk--whole boxes or folders spotted during a quick scan--and was based upon his understanding of what constituted temporary records learned from his close work with Col. Tagge.

b. A second large group of the OSS records consists of a major portion of the 3,308 cubic feet declared permanent which are being declassified by the OSS Review Team and which will be sent to NARS following the classification review and final processing by IMS/MPG. This declassified group constitutes 92%-93% of the permanent OSS records.

c. A small third group is that 7%-8% which the OSS Review Team has determined should be withheld from the permanent records because it requires continued protection from unauthorized disclosure. These are usually individual documents but some entire folders and occasionally an entire box of records.

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d. Finally, there is a small group consisting of temporary records interspersed among the permanent records which apparently had been overlooked in the broad cuts made by Col. Tagge and [REDACTED]. These include counterintelligence, personnel, and investigative files and associated records. These records not only qualify as temporary, but contain significant information either in a single document, in several documents grouped together, or in an entire folder which contain significant substantive information not likely to be found elsewhere or in such aggregate form in the permanent records. This information is essential to the Agency to

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enable it to carry out its continuing charge to perform legally required administrative services relating to the existence and activities of the OSS and to fulfill obligations such as maintaining counterintelligence files for the U.S. Government.

2. Of these four groups of records one is currently being input into the DARE system: That group of permanent records requiring continued protection (paragraph 1.c.). These records are input to DARE under Job Number 79-00332A. A computer listing of these records will serve as an index and make it easier to find individual documents in response to mandatory requests made through NARS or through the OSS index which will remain with IMS.

3. The small group of temporary records being withdrawn as essential to the CIA for meeting its ongoing legal responsibilities (paragraph 1.d.) will also require indexing to make these records retrievable. Although it is recognized that these are temporary records, it would make sense to put them into the DARE system for the following reasons: (1) a procedure is already established and is currently used for classified records that are withheld; (2) this input will serve as an index which can be manipulated in various ways to suit needs; and (3) having both groups of records in the same system will allow them to be manipulated jointly into one list to serve as a more complete index.

4. After joint discussions with IMS/MPG it has been agreed to put these records into the DARE system. To accomplish this, IMS/MPG has agreed to be responsible for completing the computer input forms. CRD has agreed to handle the terminal input largely because the number of these documents is not expected to be large and CRD has experience in this work. IMS/MPG will doublecheck computer entries for accuracy and CRD agrees to provide IMS/MPG with computer listings in the form desired by them.

5. This proposition was coordinated with the DDA computer specialist, [REDACTED] who is responsible for the DARE system and he anticipates no problems from a technical standpoint.

SIGNED

[REDACTED]

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Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - C/MPG/IMS/DO
- 1 - ISS/RMD
- ✓ 1 - CRD/OPS
- 1 - CRD/NFAC
- 1 - CRD/OSS
- 1 - Chrono

DDA/ISS/CRD [REDACTED] jhp (13 March 80)

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E.C.H.

1 May 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Staff, DDO

ATTENTION: [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED]

Chief, Classification Review Group, ISAS, DDA

SUBJECT: Division of Responsibility in Reviewing and
Preparing OSS Records for Accessioning to NARS

The following represents the agreed division of responsibility between CRG/ISAS/DDA and IMS/DDO in reviewing, preparing and processing OSS records for accessioning to NARS:

1. Tasks to be performed by the OSS review team of CRG/ISAS/DDA:

a. Review all permanent OSS records to determine those which should remain classified. Withhold and process the exempted documents according to established CRG guidelines.

b. Select and withdraw appropriate CI documents from the OSS files and process them according to established guidelines. (NOTE: X-2 investigative files and individual documents such as name trace requests and replies, are considered temporary in nature and will be withdrawn from the records by the IMS team [REDACTED] before the records are sent to CRG/OSS for review. The OSS reviewers however, should remain alert for any [REDACTED] investigative files or documents overlooked by the IMS/DDO team and, if any are found, tab them and mark as "CI." Note this fact on the records box and the IMS team will remove them when the boxes are returned to the [REDACTED])

c. Complete a form 4023A on all documents exempted from declassification including documents to remain classified which qualify for retention as OSS CI information.

d. Destroy irrelevant routing sheets particularly those containing the names of CIA personnel which would require continued protection, buck slips, incidental attached notes containing no substantive comments, and similar incidental material which simply clutters the document. An exception to this destruction rule will be the pink cover

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sheets (Form 610/archival form) showing a charge out to a requester which has subsequently been returned to the Records Center. When this type of cover sheet is attached to an unclassified or declassifiable document selected for its CI interest, it should be removed from the original of the document and placed on the copy which will go to the DDO/IMS.

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2. Tasks to be performed by the IMS/DDO team before the OSS permanent records are sent to the CRG/ISAS OSS review team for classification review:

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a. Remove all investigative files and CI documents which are considered temporary records and will not go to NARS, and do not require classification review.

b. Remove all personnel files.

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c. Initiate the necessary action to recall documents withdrawn from the OSS collection. Ensure that documents which can be found are reviewed for classification by the OSS review team before the documents are returned to the records boxes. Remove all Records Center Withdrawal Notices and Document Transfer Forms before the records are shipped to NARS. (NOTE: If members of the OSS review team encounter a Withdrawal Notice form they can ignore it; if they encounter a Document Transfer form remove it, attach to it an Archives pink cover sheet (Form 610) giving the location in the records box and send it to the IMS/DDO team at the who will retain these forms for reference purposes.)

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3. Tasks to be performed by IMS/DDO on all boxes of permanent OSS records reviewed and declassified by the OSS review team before accessioning to NARS:

a. Prepare the necessary descriptions of the records on the Request for Records Disposition Authority form and supporting paperwork as required to accession the permanent portion of the OSS records collection to NARS.

b. Conduct a final sanitization of the permanent OSS records to be accessioned to NARS to ensure that irrelevant material has been removed.

c. Update the file reference number on 4023A forms completed before final criteria were adopted.

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[Redacted]
Chief,
Classification Review Group

Classification Review Procedure/OSS

CRP 79-008/OSS

GUIDELINES FOR THE HANDLING OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

INFORMATION FOUND IN OSS RECORDS

1. Revised National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 (NSCID No. 5) entitled "U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad," makes the CIA responsible for several services of common concern to the U.S. Government including "the maintenance for the benefit of the Intelligence Community of central indices and records of foreign counterintelligence information." The Directive further states that "all departments and agencies shall contribute to this index, on a continuing basis, such material collected by them as is appropriate for a central file; this material shall be collated and analyzed for appropriate dissemination." In DCID No. 5/3, the DCI directs other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to forward to the CIA for inclusion in centralized indices and repositories of foreign counterintelligence information any information on:

(A) Personnel, organization, plans and activities of foreign ministries and departments supervising intelligence and security functions and of foreign intelligence and security services, or components thereof, that engage in one of the following activities: espionage, counterintelligence, sabotage, subversion, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare, deception and disinformation, provocation, penetration and paramilitary operations;

(B) Personnel, plans and activities of the clandestine or illegal apparatus of foreign Communist parties, irrespective of whether these appear in direct support of international activities, national parties, front organizations, or of Trotskyist or left revolutionary groups or parties;

(C) Other organized clandestine activity not covered by (A) and (B) above directed against and having a significant bearing upon the security of the U.S. and its personnel and installations abroad. DCID No. 5/3 also states that the centralized indices and repositories of foreign counterintelligence information will be used "to service name checks and visa checks requested by other departments and agencies; provide, in consonance with intelligence objectives and priorities established by the DCI, current studies and reports on foreign intelligence and security services, including information on methods of operation and reports on foreign counterintelligence aspects of international Communism; and to produce current counterintelligence reports and in-depth studies on foreign counterintelligence subjects that would be of assistance to other departments and agencies in carrying out their assigned missions."

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2. To serve these objectives this centralized repository of counter-intelligence information should be viewed as an active file containing information which may be operationally useful or provide a historical context against which to examine and analyze foreign clandestine activity. Each piece of information or document considered for inclusion in this file must pass the test of being considered relevant and useful in contributing in some way to the identification or understanding currently or historically of foreign intelligence or security services or of other groups considered capable of conducting now or in the future hostile clandestine activity inimical to U.S. interests. Normally, information about the intelligence and security services of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Tojo's Japan will not be of counterintelligence interest today, can be declassified on that basis and released to NARS. Information about the services of our allies during WW II and about our allies and countries friendly to the U.S. today, particularly those with which we maintain a liaison relationship, will be considered "liaison information" with a positive connotation. Such information will ^{not} be considered counterintelligence information for our purposes and will not be released to NARS. Information concerning the intelligence elements in the groups representing the various Eastern European countries which participated on the side of the Allies in WW II will probably be in the main "liaison information" but may include personality information or characteristic intelligence methods or techniques worthy of retention as OSS CI information. Information about the intelligence and security services and activities of the Communist countries (the Soviet Union, Maoist China and Tito's Yugoslavia during the OSS period) and those aligned with them is of counterintelligence interest and should be processed in accordance with instructions in paragraph 4 and 5 below. Should we encounter information concerning a non-aligned or third-world country which today can or could develop active intelligence interest in the U.S., it would also be processed in accordance with instructions in paragraph 5 below. It is anticipated that in general, useful CI information in OSS records will consist primarily of the identification of known middle-level intelligence and security service officers who may have advanced in their service through the intervening years to leadership position or are still active in their service; especially significant or dangerous agents or other collaborators who did or might be expected to have continued working against U.S. interests; and, information about the organization and functioning of individual foreign services or groups including unusual methods or characteristic techniques which provides us with a historical context to aid our understanding of that service or group. Counterintelligence information of this type may be divided roughly into four categories: (1) Organizations and groups; (2) Personnel involved in or supporting a clandestine activity as identified above in paragraph 1(A); (3) Methods, techniques and equipment used; and, (4) Installations, safesites or other facilities. It would be very difficult to identify all the various types of counterintelligence information that might be encountered in OSS files, ~~but here are some types of~~ information which might apply:

(A) Organizations and Groups - Information concerning the plans, missions, lines of responsibility, organizational data including schematics, diagrams or charts, and information concerning the sources of ideological, financial, logistical, organizational and institutional support.

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(B) Personnel - Information identifying individuals known (not just suspect) to have been officers, agents, informants, collaborators of other persons involved with foreign intelligence or security services or other groups or organizations which engaged in clandestine activities inimical to U.S. interests and who were involved in one or more of the following activities: espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare, and paramilitary operations including data on personnel of the illegal aparat of the Communist party.

(C) Activities and Methods - Information identifying the methods, techniques and equipment used to conduct espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, covert propaganda, psychological or unconventional warfare, and paramilitary operations including the activities and methods used by the illegal aparat of the Communist party with special attention to those techniques and methods not exclusively applicable to wartime.

(D) Installations, Safesites and Other Facilities - Information including schematics, charts, diagrams, drawings or photographs of installations, operational sites and facilities, and details of their maintenance and use.

3. The counterintelligence organ with the OSS was X-2; X-2 records should be reviewed with special care for counterintelligence information which meets the above definitions. Keep in mind however, that not all and probably not even a majority of X-2 records will meet the criteria to be retained as currently relevant counterintelligence information. For example, X-2 was required to investigate or vet all non-U.S. personnel whether potential agents, potential support personnel, or others considered for employment or recruitment by the other branches of the OSS. As a result of this responsibility, X-2 files contain not only the name check or vetting requests for potential agent personnel but also for chauffeurs, cooks, and other non-operational personnel whose identities are not considered sensitive. The purpose of the request is clearly indicated. If in doubt, err on the side of overprotection because we do not want to identify any agents or persons who were used in other operational capacities because, should it ever appear that the CIA is releasing the identities of agents and other operational personnel it will adversely impact on our national security by hampering our future ability to recruit and retain such personnel.

4. The investigative files of X-2 will be removed from OSS records before they are sent to us for review. This will be done [REDACTED] by a team from IMS/DDO. The investigative files are considered temporary records and will be held by the Agency until usefulness has ended and then they will be destroyed. Should reviewers find X-2 investigative files or individual investigative documents which were overlooked by the IMS/DDO team, they should be tabbed and marked as "CI" and left in the box. Preparation of a 4023A is not required.

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5. When documents are encountered and identified as containing CI information, they should be handled as follows:

(A) When the document is unclassified or can be declassified, a copy will be made for Agency files. The original will be left in the records box to be sent to NARS. If there is a cover sheet on the document which should be retained, remove it from the original and put it on the copy. The copy will be sent directly [REDACTED] under an archival form 610 for processing. No 4023A form input is required.

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(B) When the document requires continued protection, remove it from the records box and replace it by a Withdrawal Notice. Complete a 4023A form as for any other document requiring continued classification.

6. Agency files do not have a CI category as such. However, CI information is filed in several different categories such as liaison, illegal aparat of foreign Communist parties, Soviet Bloc installations and other subversives including terrorists, narcotic traffickers, etc. When such CI information is retained by the reviewers, it is placed in the regular exempt file and thus remains available in the Agency's own file system by search through the regular index.

[REDACTED]
Chief,
Classification Review Group

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VIA: Chief, Ops Br, CRG

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FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Conversation on CI Info in OSS
Records

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1. On 15 March 1979, I met with [REDACTED] of FPG/IMS/DDO at the latter's office to discuss the handling of CI information in the OSS records. [REDACTED] had been [REDACTED] earlier in the week and had spent time assessing the X-2 (counterintelligence) files. On the basis of this review he believes that all investigative files should be taken out en bloc and held for maybe 75 years and destroyed. In a discussion with Col. Tagge of NARS, the latter revealed that the FBI has not and will not turn over to NARS any of its investigative files and that the Army is leaning to the same decision. Col. Tagge will get a copy of the FBI Records Control Schedule for [REDACTED] to confirm the details. [REDACTED] feel that we should do the same with the OSS files. The OSS Review Team would be expected to identify the CI material and withdraw it from the records. It would be replaced by a withdrawal notice and covered by a 4023A form.

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2. [REDACTED] will prepare a draft guidance paper describing the type of CI material which the OSS Review Team would withhold.

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3. During a previous visit [REDACTED] on 8 March 1979, [REDACTED] had discussed with Col. Tagge the possibility of reconsidering the OSS cable chrono file (56-20) and naming them ~~the~~ Temporary. The main justification for this is that cable chronos in CIA records are considered Temporary and therefore those of the OSS should be too. ~~xxxxxx~~ Col. Tagge promised to bring the matter up with the Archivist but no decision has been transmitted to us as of this date. Many cables provide name traces and reflect other investigative activities and probably would require heavy sanitizing if they are to remain part ~~of~~ of the Permanent collection.

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IMS REVIEW OF OSS RECORDS

A. Background

1. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) has appraised about half of the 6500 cubic feet of OSS records as being of permanent historical value and has stated that they would like CIA to transfer those permanent records to them so that they may make the records available for public research. In keeping with NARS request, the Agency is now preparing the records for transfer. The preparation involves two separate reviews of the records.

2. The first review involves considering each classified document in the collection for possible declassification. It is being carried out by a team of retired Agency officers under the direction of the DDA/ISAS Classification Review Group. That team is:

a. Declassifying OSS records no longer requiring protection.

b. Tabbing those records which though declassified may not be released by NARS to the public without coordinating that release with other U.S. Government or foreign government agencies.

c. Certifying the necessity for continued classification of those records (largely concerning intelligence sources and methods) which may not be released to the public.

d. Removing those documents which continue to be classified from the collection for retention by CIA.

e. Substituting for the removed classified documents a withdrawal notice (Attachment A). The notice will lead an authorized researcher to additional information on his subject and will facilitate a reconstitution of the files should the withdrawn documents be declassified and turned over to NARS.

3. The second review is largely non-substantive and is being conducted for internal DO purposes and to refurbish the records prior to turnover. This second review is being carried out by the DO Information Management Staff. Procedures for the conduct of the IMS review are set forth below.

B. Conducting the IMS Review of OSS Records

IMS reviewers will proceed as follows:

1. Obtain the boxes of records to be reviewed from the

STATISTICS scheduling officer [REDACTED]

2. Review the contents of each box looking for materials described below and deal with them as prescribed.

- | | | | |
|----|--|---|---|
| a. | Withdrawal Notices
(Attachment A) | - | Leave in place |
| b. | Pink Routing and
Record Sheets
Form 610 (Attachment B) | - | (1) Remove from records
which are to be
shipped to NARS.

(2) Leave on records
being extracted with law
for retention by
the Agency. |
| c. | Tabs on documents
requiring coordination
with other U.S. agencies
or foreign governments
before being released to
the public (Attachment C) | - | Leave in place. When
transferring records
from Records Center
boxes to Archives boxes
and records under one
tab must be separated
into two or more Archives |

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CRB-00111-77

30 November 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Services Staff

FROM : Chief, PIAG/CRB

SUBJECT : Investigation of Release of OSS Documents to
National Archives

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum Titled as above dated 31 October 1977

1. As requested in reference, a survey was made to determine what security precautions are taken at National Archives (NARS) to protect classified material in its custody and how effective are these procedures. Discussions with appropriate personnel at National Archives and in this Agency lead this writer to the conclusion that the risk of possible exposure or compromise of classified material at NARS is minimal.

2. Personnel at NARS are not overly enamored with the idea of handling classified material even though they are set up to handle classified records. Given the nature of the charter under which NARS operates, it is more appropriate for that organization to receive and accession unclassified material which can be made readily available to the public. Notwithstanding, when National Archives does receive classified material, there is appropriate secure storage space suitable to effect control and access to these records. Classified storage areas at NARS are limited to security cleared NARS personnel and these areas are inaccessible to the public. Any request made for records in such a classified collection is serviced by cleared NARS personnel. The system is not entirely fool proof since retrieval of records may in some cases be done by GS-04's and GS-05's who may not always be fully cognizant of security implications. However, overall the system does appear to provide normal and reasonable protection and at an acceptable level of risk. NARS personnel are most cooperative and are responsive to the security needs of this Agency.

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3. Conversations were initiated with Col. Raymond Tagge, document Appraiser at NARS on 10 November 1977 concerning the possibility of "offering" the OSS record collection to NARS. A second meeting took place on 23 November in the office of Mr. [REDACTED] Col. Tagge has agreed to prepare a preliminary draft of a memorandum proposing a conditional offering to NARS of the OSS records. Col. Tagge will include in his draft a special section entitled "restrictions" in which various conditions, caveats and limitations may be spelled out. The draft should be returned to [REDACTED] sometime in December for review and any changes or additions which this Agency may wish to make.

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4. Col. Tagge anticipates that he will be able to schedule time for

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
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an appraisal of the "offering" by late winter or early spring. Col. Tagge is currently involved in several other appraisal jobs and is also working on five (5) Records Control Schedules for this Agency. He will not be able to schedule the OSS appraisal until after completing those jobs. Col. Tagge does not appear overly concerned about obtaining an early acquisition of these records. In an off-hand remark he indicated that NARS had no real claim to physical possession of these records until they were 50 years old. It is obvious, however, that early possession of these records by NARS would benefit the public and other researchers. Col. Tagge has no problem with the manner in which the review of OSS documents is currently being handled although he does recognize that based on his appraisal of these documents that some small adjustments will be required in the future to bring the declassification review and processing in line with such recommendations as he may make after a detailed appraisal of these holdings.

5. Recommendations concerning the handling and disposition of the OSS records would be somewhat premature at this time. Recommendations will be made following further discussions with Col. Tagge and after he completes his appraisal of the OSS records. The above action is being closely coordinated with appropriate offices and officers in DDA and ISAS.

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